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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10068Minimum wages have again surfaced as a central issue in labor market pol-
icy in the region. In countries such as Mexico and Brazil, the real level of
the minimum wage became so eroded over the 1980s that there is pressure
to provide a “living” income for those at the lower tail of the distribution.
On the other hand, high rates of unemployment in some countries and the
premium that more open trade postures put on labor market ﬂexibility has
made policy makers wary of introducing new rigidities.
This chapter ﬁrst provides an overview of the levels of minimum wages
in Latin America and their true impact on the distribution of wages using
both numerical measures and kernel density plots for eight countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and
Uruguay). In particular, it attempts to identify eﬀects higher in the wage
distribution and in the unregulated or “informal” sector. The central mes-
sage is that the minimum wage has impacts on wage setting far beyond
those usually contemplated and likely beyond those found in the industri-
alized countries. The ﬁnal section then employs panel employment data
from Colombia, a country where minimum wages seem high and very bind-
ing, to quantify these eﬀects and their impact on employment.
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and Caribbean region, the World Bank.1.1 The Importance of the Minimum Wage
The redistributional eﬀects of the minimum wage may have the potential
to reduce poverty and even foster growth (see Freeman and Freeman [1992]
for a summary of the U.S. debate), but the larger concern in the literature
is that the secondary eﬀects through the creation of new rigidities in the la-
bor market and the potential decrease in employment opportunities may
oﬀset these gains. The simplest textbook models suggest that putting a
wage ﬂoor above the equilibrium level will lead to a fall in employment.
These eﬀects have traditionally appeared to be weak in the United States,
perhaps with the exception of young workers (see, for example, Brown,
Gilroy, and Kohen 1982; Card, Katz, and Krueger 1993). Dickens,
Machin, and Manning (1999) argue that their ﬁnding from the United
Kingdom of important impacts on wages, but none on employment, is con-
sistent with the fact that employers generally have some monopsony power
in contrast to the usual textbook competitive model.
However, other work does ﬁnd important adverse eﬀects on employ-
ment. Currie and Fallick (1996), Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000), and Neumark and Wascher
(1992) report sharp disemployment eﬀects for those constrained by the
minimum wage, with employment elasticities of between 0.4 to 1.6 (in ab-
solute value).1 Comparing the United States to France, Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margoliz (1999) ﬁnd strong negative impacts on employment in the
latter on those workers who earn around the minimum wage. Using a
pooled cross-section-time series panel from the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Neumark and Wascher
(1999) ﬁnd evidence of employment losses for youth, although the magni-
tude of the impact diminishes where subminimum wages exist for youth
and where employers have some discretion in adjusting nonpecuniary
characteristics of jobs.
The evidence from Latin America overall suggests large eﬀects. Freeman
and Freeman’s (1991) analysis of the imposition of U.S. minimum wage
norms on Puerto Rico in 1977 leads them to argue that the weak U.S. evi-
dence results primarily from the fact that the minimum wage is so low as to
“nibble” rather than “bite” at the wage distribution. When the minimum in
Puerto Rico was raised to 63 percent of the average manufacturing wage,
the elasticity of employment to the minimum wage became 0.91, and rais-
ing the wage led to massive job loss on the island. Card and Krueger (1995),
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1. They argue that the Card, Katz, and Krueger (1993) ﬁndings of no impact results from
misspeciﬁcation both in the omission of a school enrollment eﬀect and lagged dependent
variable and incorrect estimation approach that, when corrected, removes the inconsistency
in their ﬁndings. Card, Katz, and Krueger (1993) take issue with the latter set of ﬁndings on
several counts, although in addressing these issues Neumark and Wascher (1993) ﬁnd their
original conclusions strengthened.however, argue that these results are not robust and, in fact, once they cor-
rect for the overweighting of very small ﬁrms they ﬁnd that employment
increased (Card and Krueger 1995, 272). Nonetheless, the presence of ad-
verse employment eﬀects appears to be supported by Bell (1997) in her
study using manufacturing panel data from Mexico and Colombia. She
ﬁnds no impact of the minimum wage in Mexico, where it was not binding.
However, in Colombia, she ﬁnds an employment elasticity of unskilled
workers on the order of 0.15–0.33 and for skilled workers 0.03–0.24, with
the eﬀect on workers paid near the minimum wage between 0.55 to 1.22.
She concludes that, across the period 1981–1987, the 10 percent rise in the
minimum wage from 1981–1987 reduced low-skilled, low-wage Colombia
employment in the range of 2 percent–12 percent.
The potentially very high elasticities of those earning near the minimum
wage makes the overall impact on poverty potentially ambiguous; an elas-
ticity over 1 implies that total income transfers to the target group fallwith
a rise in the wage. In the United States, the evidence is ambiguous. As ex-
amples, Card and Krueger (1995) ﬁnd weakly signiﬁcant improvements in
poverty, whereas Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000) ﬁnd that
earned incomes of low-wage workers decline in response to minimum wage
increases, and poverty actually increases.2 The debate arguably becomes
more relevant in less developed countries (LDCs) where enforcement of
labor norms is thought not to extend to the “informal” sector. This group
of workers is generally found in the unregulated microﬁrm (usually under
ﬁve employees) sector, where neither employers nor employees are regis-
tered with social protection institutions or authorities more generally.
Standard dualistic models ranging from the earliest (Harris and Todaro
1970) to some of the most recent (Agenor and Aizenman 1999) see these
unprotected workers as the disadvantaged sector of a labor market seg-
mented by nominal wage rigidities such as the minimum wage. Here, the
worker who loses his job has no access to unemployment insurance and in-
stead takes refuge in the informal sector where the wage adjusts to accom-
modate supply. In this case, a rise in the minimum wage forces some work-
ers into jobs where they earn below what they did before. The available
empirical evidence for Latin America is ambiguous. Morely (1995) and de
Janvry and Sadoulet (1996) ﬁnd that poverty falls with a rise in the mini-
mum wage, but only for periods of recovery in the former study and only
in periods of recession in the latter. Using worldwide LDC data, Lustig
and McLeod (1997) conﬁrm a negative eﬀect on employment and poverty.
The minimum wage also enters strongly into debates about the impacts
of mandated nonwage beneﬁt payments and other regulations on labor de-
mand. If, for instance, the worker fully values the health insurance pro-
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2. Their evidence suggests that the pressure for implementing minimum wages comes from
unions seeking to reduce wage competition.vided by the employer, then, in a market with no rigidities, his or her wage
will fall by an equivalent amount. However, in the presence of a wage ﬂoor,
the mandated beneﬁt raises total costs to the worker and hence reduces to-
tal demand. In reality, most regulation can be imagined as a tax on ﬁrms
whose incidence depends partly on how much workers value it and partly
on rigidities in the nominal wage. As an example, restrictions on ﬁring
implicitly deprive the ﬁrm of an “option” to divest itself of an asset (the
worker) and therefore a tax equal to the option value. This could be passed
down to the worker as the cost of job security if the worker is risk averse,
but not if the minimum wage is binding. The adverse employment eﬀects of
poorly designed labor market policies thus can become more extreme in
the presence of minimum wages.
A ﬁnal consideration is how minimum wages may aﬀect how economies
adjust to shocks, whether through employment or wages. In the 1994–1995
Tequila crisis, Mexico allowed real wages to be eroded over 25 percent and
saw only moderate increases in unemployment. The Colombian Constitu-
tion, on the contrary, insists on a salario minimo movil, which has been in-
terpreted dictating indexation to past inﬂation, and this has arguably con-
tributed to the high rates of unemployment experienced in response to the
ﬁnancial crisis of 1998.
1.2 Numerical Measures of the Incidence of Minimum Wages
Raw comparisons of the real minimum wage across countries are of lim-
ited use. From both the perspective of improving equity and minimizing la-
bor market distortions, what is of interest is the level of the minimum wage
relative to the distribution of remuneration in the individual country. To
argue that the minimum is “too low” in Brazil because it is a fraction of that
in Argentina is irrelevant if overall labor productivity diﬀers by similar
magnitudes.
As a ﬁrst cut at international comparison, ﬁgure 1.1 ranks various Latin
American and OECD countries by the minimum wage standardized by the
mean wage (SMW).3Latin America spans the range with Uruguay, Bolivia,
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico having the lowest values, and Vene-
zuela, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Honduras having among the highest.4
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3. The source for countries discussed in detail here are International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) staﬀ estimates for the most recent years available. All others
come from Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (1999).
4. The analysis uses the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) from Argentina, the Contin-
uous Household Survey (ECH) from Bolivia, the National Survey from the Sample of House-
holds (PNAD) from Brazil, the Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional
(CASEN) from Chile, the Multipurpose Permanent Survey (EPHM) for Honduras, and the
National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) from Mexico. We restrict the sample to those
sixteen–sixty-ﬁve, working between thirty and ﬁfty hours a week for informal salaried work-
ers (those working for ﬁrms of ﬁve employees or below) and formal salaried workers (six
workers and above).Although informative, standardizing by the ﬁrst moment is not suﬃ-
cient to tell us whether the minimum wage is binding for two reasons. First,
the number of workers aﬀected will depend on the higher moments of the
distribution as well; more disperse endowments of human capital (vari-
ance) or a particularly large fraction of poorly endowed workers (skew-
ness) would lead to more workers being aﬀected by a given SMW. Second,
if the minimum wage is not enforced, very high SMWs are irrelevant.
As a second cut, table 1.1oﬀers several additional measures that attempt
to provide a more rounded view. The ﬁrst column presents the SMW, and
the second standardizes by the wage at the 50th quantile (median). The me-
dian is a better measure of the central tendency because it is less sensitive
to extreme values in the upper tail and to compression of the lower tail by
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Fig. 1.1 Minimum wage/mean wage in OECD countries and in Latin Americathe minimum wage. Using it to standardize reverses the SMW rankings of
Argentina and Brazil. This eﬀect is even more dramatic if we standardize
by the wage at the 10th quantile of the distribution, arguably the range that
is of more concern than the center.5 Brazil suddenly appears among the
countries with the most potentially binding minimum wage (excluding
Honduras), and far above Argentina and Uruguay. This makes sense when
it is noted that Brazil shows the highest wage variance among countries
overall and among countries for which the sample is purely urban.
1.3 Graphical Analysis–Kernel Density Plots
However revealing theoretically, the 10th quantile, variance and skew-
ness measures are problematic because they describe the distribution after
the imposition of the minimum wage. A graphic approach, however, can re-
liably reveal how the distribution is distorted. The ﬁrst panels of ﬁgure 1.2
are kernel estimates of the density function, with a vertical line to mark the
location of the minimum wage.6Kernel density estimators approximate the
density f(x) from observations on x. The estimator calculates the density
at the center of the weighted xs found within a rolling interval or “window.”
They diﬀer from histogram both in allowing the windows to overlap and by
the possibility of diﬀerent weighting schemes on the xs.
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics on Minimum Wages and Wage Distributions
Minimum Wage
Country Date Mean 50th 10th Standard Deviation Skewness
Argentinaa 1998 0.26 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.53
Bolivia 1997 0.22 0.34 0.80 0.80 0.51
Brazil 1998 0.24 0.43 1.00 0.86 0.61
Brazila 1998 0.22 0.37 1.00 0.71 0.60
Chile 1996 0.34 0.55 1.09 0.77 0.58
Colombiaa 1998 0.40 0.68 1.00 0.51 1.16
Honduras 1999 0.62 0.90 2.26 0.80 –0.14
Mexicoa 1999 0.34 0.48 0.87 0.64 0.83
Uruguaya 1998 0.19 0.27 0.64 0.72 0.06
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: Samples include workers between sixteen–sixty-ﬁve years of age working thirty–ﬁfty
hours as salaried workers.
aUrban areas only.
5. Ten percent of the sample earns below this wage, and ninety percent earns above this
wage.
6. See DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) for a thorough treatment of kernel density es-
timation and Velez and Santamaria (1999) for an application of the cumulative distribution
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The function K determines the weights and is termed the “kernel.” This es-
timator has the advantage of giving a clearer idea of the shape of the dis-
tribution, but it is sensitive to the bandwidth chosen to smooth. This is par-
ticularly important for detecting the impact of minimum wages because an
excessively large bandwidth will smooth exactly the “cliﬀ” where the min-
imum wage is binding. Some adjustments away from the default were nec-
essary to present the most revealing plot.
The second panels are the cumulative distributions of wages. These re-
quire no judgements about bandwidths and the vertical “cliﬀs” indicate
where the minimum wage, or multiples, may be inﬂuencing. Both the in-
formal and formal wage distributions are plotted in light and dark lines, re-
spectively.7 In each graph, a “piling up” of the probability mass around the
minimum wage, represented in all ﬁgures by a vertical line, suggests that
the policy has, in eﬀect, forced a change in the distribution.
1.3.1 Interpretation
What is immediately clear is that minimum wages do have the capacity
to alter strongly the distribution of wages. Colombia provides an extreme
example; the dramatic cliﬀs in the plots occurring around the minimum
wage line, the low standard deviation, and the high skewness (table 1.1)
likely reﬂect the impact of the minimum wage rather than the underlying
distribution of human capital, conﬁrming the more detailed ﬁndings of
Santamaria (1998). Somewhat in contrast to common wisdom, of the Mer-
cosur countries, Brazil and Chile appear to have more binding minimum
wages in the formal sector than either the allegedly very rigid Argentina, or
Uruguay.
More generally, enforcement varies widely across the region, and SMWs
appear to be somewhat deceptive measures of the eﬃcacy of the minimum
wage to aﬀect distribution or measures of labor market distortion. Chile
and Colombia have SMWs far below that of Honduras, yet the distortion
of the wage distributions in the ﬁrst two seems dramatic in comparison.
This suggests that a country’s location in the range of SMWs (ﬁgure 1.1) is
insuﬃcient to indicate the impact of a rise in minimum wage and that em-
pirical work with only the statutory measures may give a misleading pic-
ture of what is going on.
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7. The informal sector is deﬁned in each country either by whether a salaried worker is un-
aﬃliated with social security systems, or works in very small ﬁrms (around six workers or
less). The Colombian survey, in particular, has only limited data and therefore shows little
diﬀerence in means between the two.120 William F. Maloney and Jairo Nuñez Mendez
1.3.2 The Impact on the Informal Sector
In virtually all countries, there is evidence of what has been termed in
Brazil the Efeito Farol or lighthouse eﬀect on the informal distribution.8
That is, the formal sector minimum wage serves as a reference throughout
the economy, including sectors not legally bound by it. In fact, the inﬂuence
seems far stronger on the informal sector than the formal in Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, and Uruguay, countries where the wage appears largely irrele-
vant to the formal distribution. In each of these cases, the lighter shaded
informal wage distribution to the left of the formal sector distribution
shows greater distortions around the minimum than is the case in the for-
mal sector. It may be argued that the minimum wage is simply a signal of
the wage level in high inﬂation countries, but the evidence is not support-
ive: Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have very moderate rates of inﬂation in
the sample period. Though probably not enforced by law, the minimum
wage appears to be an important benchmark for “fair” remuneration.
This would seem to turn conventional conceptions of the relationship
between the informal and formal sectors on their heads—the binding wage
ﬂoor is now in the informal sector—and raises new questions about the ra-
zon de ser of the informal sector. If it is an inferior unprotected sector, why
do workers receive some beneﬁts and not others? Why does some concept
of fairness dictate that informal workers should get the minimum wage, but
not beneﬁts? One possibility is that forwarded by Maloney (1998) that the
sector is as much a way of avoiding the ineﬃciencies of labor market regu-
lation as the regulations themselves. As discussed earlier, where there is no
wage ﬂoor in the formal sector, the costs of beneﬁts to employers may be
largely passed down to workers in the form of lower wages. If this implicit
tax is higher than the perceived beneﬁts, then there is an incentive to evade
and seek informal employment. Given that informal workers are, on aver-
age, substantially younger than formal workers, it may be that many are
still covered by their fathers’ health insurance or are recurring to less for-
mal forms of social protection and hence would resist paying the implicit
tax again. Further, the often gross ineﬃciencies in beneﬁts provision drive
another wedge between beneﬁts and implicit taxes.
This ﬁnding also suggests that the standard dualistic model that sees the
ﬂexible informal sector wage as permitting the absorption of workers ra-
tioned out from the rigid formal sector is seriously incomplete. It is not
clear why we shouldn’t also expect a downward sloping demand curve in
the informal sector and hence that the binding minimum wage leads to job
loss there and reduced capacity to absorb the unemployed. Again, the pres-
8. The original reference of the Teoria do Farol is found with reference to Brazil in Souza
and Baltar (1979). For more recent references, see Neri, Gonzaga, and Camargo (2000) as
well as Amadeo, Gill, and Neri (2000). For recent work on minimum wages in Brazil, see
Lemos (2003) and Neumark, Cunningham, and Siga (2003).ent Colombian situation comes to mind.9 The historically unprecedented
unemployment rates may partially arise from the shock to formal produc-
tion due to the collapse of the ﬁnancial sector, but also the jobs lost in the
informal sector with the sharp rise in the minimum wage over the last sev-
eral years.
1.3.3 The Minimum Wage as a Reference for Other Formal Wages
Throughout the region it is common to use the minimum wage as a more
general unit of account or numeraire, for instance, in quoting wages or
monetary contracts in general. In Brazil, for example, Neri, Gonzaga, and
Camargo (2000) ﬁnd strong evidence of this eﬀect throughout the wage dis-
tribution, ﬁnding that 9 percent of formal sector workers received exactly
one minimum wage, but another 6 percent received exactly a multiple. Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay appear to show regular “cliﬀs”
across the distribution that are synchronized between both the formal and
informal sectors. The next section will test more explicitly for these eﬀects.
1.4 Econometric Evidence on the Impact of 
the Minimum Wage from Colombia
In this section, we follow Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000) in
employing rotating panel data from Colombia to test the impact of a rise
in the minimum wage on wages and the probability of becoming unem-
ployed, and for numeraireeﬀects in both. The existence of the panel, as well
as the impression from the previous section that the minimum wage is high
and binding made Colombia an obvious case study.
Since 1997, the National Statistical Agency (DANE) has created a ro-
tating panel by reinterviewing 25 percent of households interviewed in the
previous round of the National Household Survey (ENH), yielding a set
of two consecutive quarterly observations on the same households. Indi-
viduals were identiﬁed by household and then on the basis of gender, age,
marital status, relation with the head of household, schooling level, and
years of education, variables which do not change between quarters. The
Euclidian distance from each individual, with respect to the rest of the in-
habitants of a house, is calculated and the match accepted if the distance
is below a predetermined threshold. Roughly 15 percent of the individu-
als in a survey can be linked to the past one in eleven rotating surveys. As
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9. Fiess, Fugazza, and Maloney (1999), for example, ﬁnd that the Mexican and, to a lesser
degree, the informal and formal sectors behave across the business cycle as if they were inte-
grated sectors-earnings relative to the formal sector rise with share of the workforce in infor-
mality. In Colombia, on the other hand, the traditional dualistic view seems more supported
with informal self-employment serving as a last resort and unemployment dramatically ris-
ing. See also Maloney (2003a,b) and Cunningham and Maloney (2001) for further discus-
sions of the desirability of the informal sector.122 William F. Maloney and Jairo Nuñez Mendez
table 1.2 shows, when we restrict to that used in the kernel density plots—
men working thirty–ﬁfty hours per week—we have a total of 10,633 ob-
servations who are employed in the ﬁrst period. Slightly over 19 percent
of these will become unemployed in the second period. Of these, 66 per-
cent report being salaried workers, and 34 percent report being self-
employed. Although the year chosen to estimate the kernel density plots
permitted separating “formal” from “informal” wage earners in every
period, this is not the case in other years, and we combine the two in the
“salaried” sector. Roughly 25 percent earn below the minimum wage.
However, the vast majority of these, as suggested in the kernel density
plots, are informal.
We examine the self-employed as a control that can help separate gen-
eral price indexing eﬀects from “true” minimum wage eﬀects. If the mini-
mum is simply an economywide mechanism for coordinating prices, we
might see the self-employed using it to ﬁx their product prices. If this were
not the case, we would expect that their incomes would be determined by
the proﬁtability of their enterprise, and they would not raise their implicit
“wage” at the risk of becoming uncompetitive.
The panel nature of the data permits identifying the impact of the two
annual changes in the minimum wage that occurred between 1997 and the
end of the available sample in 1999.10 We estimate the determinants of the
percentage change in the real hourly wage worker i receives, (dw) or the
probability of becoming unemployed (prob[z   1]) across two quarters as
Table 1.2 Colombia: Distribution of Sample by Salary Range
Employed in t   1 Unemployed in t   1
Salary in terms of
Minimum Wage Workers Percentage Workers Percentage
0.0–0.5 559 6.24 267 15.99
0.5–0.7 574 6.40 229 13.71
0.7–0.9 1,112 12.41 237 14.19
0.9–1.1 1,444 16.11 235 14.07
1.1–1.3 1,095 12.22 145 8.68
1.3–1.5 536 5.98 85 5.09
1.5–2.0 965 10.77 132 7.90
2.0–3.0 1,121 12.51 155 9.28
3.0–4.0 455 5.08 49 2.93
 4.0 1,102 12.29 136 8.14
Total 8,963 100 1,670 100
Note: Sample includes men who work thirty–ﬁfty hours per week.
10. This period corresponds to what is widely acknowledged as the country’s worst em-
ployment crisis in the postwar period.(2) dw, prob(z 1)  ∑
j
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where mw is the real minimum wage, respectively, in the two periods.11
Though it is common to examine the impact of the minimum wage on
wages and employment at the minimum wage, the kernel density plots sug-
gest that there are numeraire eﬀects throughout the distribution. If we are
interested in the total eﬀect of the minimum wage on distribution and em-
ployment, we need to look for these eﬀects as well. Further, there may be
general equilibrium eﬀects at higher wage levels through changes in rela-
tive demand. For these reasons, we create j dummy variables, the vector R,
that locate individual i’s wage in the real hourly wage distribution in year 1
at fractions and multiples of the minimum wage (table 1.2). This allows us
to see the impact of a change of minimum wage, not only on those earning
one minimum wage, but also those earning, for example, two or three times
the minimum wage.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side of the equation captures this eﬀect
of a change in the minimum wage on diﬀerent regions of the wage distri-
bution. The second term permits the level of wage growth, independent of
minimum wage eﬀects, to change by each cohort in the wage distribution.
The third term induces more ﬂexibility in the function, allowing the esti-
mation of the implicit spline speciﬁcation without constraining the lines to
join at the knot points.
Finally, X is a vector with the individual characteristics such as gen-
der, age, education, and so on, T and A are a set of quarterly and regional
dummy variables which capture the dependence of observations of the
same period (including seasonal eﬀects) and region, respectively.
Previous papers ﬁnd that low-income families receive a short-run bene-
ﬁt when the minimum wage increases but are negatively aﬀected over the
longer term (Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2000). This is because
short-run adjustments are made via prices and long-run adjustments via
quantities; ﬁrms must follow the law at ﬁrst, but then, if required, they ﬁre
workers. For this reason, the lagged minimum wage gain (mw1– mw0)/mw0
is also introduced. From the point of view of measuring these longer-run
impacts, it would be preferable to have, as Neumark, Schweitzer, and
Wascher (2000) do, a full year span rather than the two quarter panels the
ENH oﬀers. This limitation may not be as serious as appears at ﬁrst for
measuring the impact on wages because the generally higher inﬂation rates
in Latin America erode more quickly any mandated increase in the mini-
mum wage than in the United States. It has also been argued by Brown,
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11. The deﬂator used was the consumer price index for each city.124 William F. Maloney and Jairo Nuñez Mendez
Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) that the high turnover in low-skilled workers may
imply that employment adjustment in the most critical ranges around the
minimum wage may be relatively rapid. Further, Maloney (2001) shows
that average manufacturing tenure in Latin America is roughly 70 percent
of the OECD, so the quantity adjustment might occur more rapidly. None-
theless, we put less weight in our analysis on the lags and do not follow
Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000) in generating “representative”
worker responses to lagged minimum wages.12
1.4.1 Eﬀects on Wages
Table 1.3 reports the eﬀects on real wages of a change in the real mini-
mum wage on salaried workers. The results are broadly consistent with
Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000). Around the minimum wage,
those earning 0.7–0.9 minimum wages, the eﬀect is high for salaried work-
ers; 0.87 of the rise in minimum wages is communicated to wages. Moving
Table 1.3 Colombia: Eﬀect of a 1 Percent Rise in the Minimum Wage on
Hourly Salaries
Salary in terms of 
Minimum Wage Self-Employed Lag Salaried Lag
0.0–0.5 0.9860∗∗∗ –0.0653∗∗∗ 1.7411∗∗∗ –0.1191
0.5–0.7 1.0695∗∗ 0.0796 1.2325∗∗∗ –0.1865∗∗
0.7–0.9 1.1598 0.0486 0.8723∗∗∗ –0.1576∗
0.9–1.1 1.2723 0.0563 0.5971∗∗∗ –0.1746∗
1.1–1.3 0.4563 0.0583 0.6607∗∗∗ –0.1618∗
1.3–1.5 0.1591 0.0652 0.2861∗∗ –0.1806∗
1.5–2.0 0.7346 0.0597 0.3896∗∗∗ –0.1794∗
2.0–3.0 0.4508 0.0626 0.3528∗∗∗ –0.1816∗
3.0–4.0 0.1242 0.0680 0.3848∗∗ –0.1654∗
 4.0 0.0843 0.0703 0.1611∗∗∗ –0.1736∗
Average 0.6378∗∗∗ –0.1696∗∗∗
N 2,744 5,267
Notes: Sample includes men who work thirty–ﬁfty hours per week. N   number of observa-
tions.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
12. Neumark argues that, generally speaking, the lag has the usual interpretation as long as
the individual history is not relevant, that is, that the contemporary eﬀect of a change in the
minimum wage does not depend on past wages. The problem that he highlights is that a rise
in the minimum wage in the previous period may have “swept up” a worker into a diﬀerent
category. Therefore, the correct total eﬀects (contemporaneous plus lagged) needs somehow
to compensate for individuals changing classiﬁcation, which involves generating a set of rep-
resentative workers in each cell.up the income scale, the eﬀect remains signiﬁcant for up to four minimum
wages, although with decreasing coeﬃcients and falling to only 0.16 for
those earning more than four minimum wages. What is remarkable is that
the eﬀect dies oﬀmuch more slowly than in the United States. Between two
and three minimum wages, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000)
found an impact of only 0.06 percent, whereas in Colombia at four mini-
mum wages the impact is 0.38. This suggests a far greater numeraire eﬀect
and hence substantially greater impact of the minimum wage on the over-
all distribution. As Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000) found, very
large eﬀects are found below the minimum wage, and we also do not have
an obvious explanation for this. The self-employed show a signiﬁcant eﬀect
below the minimum wage, but overall, there appears to be little impact on
the distribution above the minimum wage. This suggests that the impact is
not through the minimum wage acting as a general signal of price rises
throughout the economy.
The eﬀect of a one-quarter lag suggests two interesting eﬀects. First,
across the wage distribution there is a signiﬁcant, and broadly uniform
(about 17 percent), erosion of the ﬁrst period eﬀect, perhaps due to inﬂa-
tion. This suggests that we cannot take the impact eﬀect as the wage rise
that ﬁrms will use in making employment decisions. Second, again the im-
pact on the self-employed is virtually never signiﬁcant, and the magnitudes
are roughly one-third of those for salaried workers. This suggests that not
only do the self-employed not respond strongly to lighthouse eﬀects but
that they may update their “wages” frequently to avoid inﬂation erosion.
This, in fact, may be one of the advantages of being self-employed versus
salaried in high inﬂation environments.
1.4.2 Eﬀects on Employment
Table 1.4 shows the consequent eﬀects on employment. Equation (2) is
run again, but this time as a logit, where the individual is assigned a value
of 1 if he retains his job and a 0 if he is without a job in the second quarter.
The results are consistent with the wage regressions. A rise in the mini-
mum wage has a statistically very signiﬁcant impact on the probability of
becoming unemployed that again decreases with a rising position in the
wage distribution. The lags echo this pattern and suggest that, as might be
expected, the adjustment does not take place instantaneously. On average,
the contemporaneous eﬀect is roughly twice that found by Neumark,
Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000) for the United States and, again, extends
far higher in the distribution. Corresponding to the apparent impact on the
wages of the very lowest ranges of the self-employed distribution, there are
negative impacts on employment as well as some impacts higher in the dis-
tribution. Figure 1.3 graphs both the impact on wages and unemployment
probability by position in the distribution.
The regressions, therefore, suggest statistically very signiﬁcant eﬀects on
Measuring the Impact of Minimum Wages: Latin America 125Table 1.4 Colombia: Eﬀect of a 1 Percent Rise in the Minimum Wage on the
Probability of Becoming Unemployed
Salary in terms of 
Minimum Wage Self-Employed Lag Salaried Lag
0.0–0.5 –0.2259∗∗∗ –0.2205∗∗∗ –0.3566∗∗∗ –0.3462∗∗∗
0.5–0.7 –0.2207∗∗∗ –0.2160∗∗∗ –0.3151∗∗∗ –0.3035∗∗∗
0.7–0.9 –0.1611∗∗ –0.1541∗∗ –0.2715∗∗∗ –0.2615∗∗∗
0.9–1.1 –0.0921 –0.0847 –0.2765∗∗∗ –0.2595∗∗∗
1.1–1.3 –0.1182 –0.1206∗ –0.2298∗∗∗ –0.2169∗∗∗
1.3–1.5 –0.1378∗ –0.1327∗∗ –0.2933∗∗∗ –0.2890∗∗∗
1.5–2.0 –0.1044 –0.0988 –0.0967 –0.0623
2.0–3.0 –0.0620 –0.0505 –0.1962∗∗ –0.1675∗∗
3.0–4.0 –0.0408 –0.0343 –0.2530∗∗∗ –0.2204∗∗
 4.0 –0.0695 –0.0653 –0.1969∗ –0.1933∗∗
N 3,128 5,835
Notes: Sample includes men who work thirty–ﬁfty hours per week. N   number of observa-
tions.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Fig. 1.3 Colombia: Impact of minimum wage on wages and employmentemployment and magnitudes of eﬀect far larger than those seen in the
United States. However, because they measure the impact on the ﬂow out
of employment, they cannot answer the question of what happens to the
total stock of jobs. As a very rough ﬁrst approximation, we run equation
(2) again—eliminating the R dummies (leaving only the constant) so as to
get the “average” eﬀect of the minimum wage rise—eﬀectively integrating
under the wage distribution in table 1.3. The average contemporaneous im-
pact is 0.64 and lagged is –0.17, leaving a total eﬀect of 0.47 percent rise in
wages. We then multiply this by the Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001) esti-
mate of the long-run own-wage elasticity of blue-collar manufacturing em-
ployment of 0.32. If there is no further inﬂationary erosion, this would im-
ply an elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage of 0.15.
This is quite consistent with Bell’s (1997) estimates and suggests that the 9
percent rise in minimum wage in 1999 would have had the eﬀect of reduc-
ing employment by 1.4 percent.
1.5 Conclusion
The Colombian case conﬁrms the evidence oﬀered by the kernel density
estimates. First, the minimum wage can have an important impact on the
wage distribution in the neighborhood of the minimum wage. Second, the
eﬀects echo up the wage distribution in a way that suggests important nu-
meraire eﬀects. That this eﬀect is far stronger than found by Neumark,
Schweitzer, and Wascher (2000) in the United States suggests that the min-
imum wage induces farther-reaching rigidities in the labor market and that
the trade oﬀ between any possible eﬀect on poverty and reduced ﬂexibility
is likely to be more severe in Latin America. The employment eﬀects are
shown to be large as a result. The data did not allow testing of the impacts
on informal salaried sector wages, but the kernel density plots speak con-
vincingly about the lighthouse eﬀect and the potentially greater impact on
the informal sector. In sum, the minimum wage has impacts both in the
higher reaches of the formal distribution and in the informal labor markets
that magnify its distortionary eﬀects beyond what was previously thought.
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